L3: 3 Thought: in origin and nature?
“Hipparchus reads out the next question: 5: Are there determinate facts about what is meant? This continues from the last point. Consider the person who is experiencing pain and hearing piano tuning and who says that ‘it’ will stop soon. It is interesting that Wittgenstein flirts with the idea that, in what they say later, they are creating a connection. That would be a matter of thinking it making it so of the idealistic sort. Let us construe thinking of the putative fact as that they are thinking of the noise, not the pain. They mean the noise. What makes it the case that that holds? Well, an idealist might say: that they think that that is what they are thinking. We can make this more obvious by saying: that they say that that is what they are thinking. And we can imagine that this ‘after the fact’ comment – after the fact of thinking – might create the object of thought. Later saying that it was the noise retrospectively makes it the noise, not the pain. In fact, Crispin...
